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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
WANDA CARTER,
)
Plaintiff and Rspondent, ,

vs.
ERCIL V. CARTER,
Defendant and Appellant.

CASE

> NO. 10751

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for a division and partition of ·the
interest in the family home involved in divorce decree entered by the Court on March 14, 1949.
DISPOSmON IN LOWER COURT
Defendant made a Motion to the Court in November
of 1965 to have the property in question sold and the ~
ceecls to be awarded first to the defendant for ·the value of
his separate labors and expenses put in the property since
t:he Decree of Divorce was entered, and to order the remainder of the proceeds to be divided equally between the plain-

tiff and the defendant. The Court denied defendant's
motion in a minute entry of the Court, dated December 27,
1965, but no order wa,s issued by the Court denying such.
In April of 1966, the defendant petitioned the Court to divide and partition the interest in the family home. 'Dhe
plaintiff at this time also petitioned the Court to award
the family home of the parties to the plaintiff. The Court,
on the 13th day of October, 1966, issued an order denying
all motions and petitions filed by either of the parties.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a decision setting aside the order
of the 13th day of October, 1966, and the minute entry of
December 27, 1965, made by the trial court, and to have
the case remanded to the lower court with instructions to
divide and partition the interest in the family home .

STATMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and the defendant were married in 1939,
and on March 14, 1949, the Court entered an Interlocutory
Decree of Divorce between the parties and in favor of the
plaintiff. Within two weeks after this Decree of Divorce
was entered by the Court, the parties resumed a marital relationship and continued this relationship for a period of
over 14 years, and another child was born to the parties
on April 16, 1951, as a result of this reconciliation.
The 1949 Decree provided that the plaintiff was entitled
to the -use and occupancy of the house and lot in which
·..
the plaintiff and defendant and their children had been
residing, and that the plaintiff was not to sell said place
without the consent of the Court and the agreement of the
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plaintiff and defendant. This was done in order that the
Court might make a fair and equitable distribution of the
proc£eds. The purpose of said decree and the agreement
or the parties at that time was to grant the posression and
use of the home for the rearing ad upbringing of the minor
children, but the plaintiff was not granted fee simple title
to the property. The proceeds of the property were to be
later divided between the parties after the use of the home
was no longer necessary for the rearing of the children.
On the 14th of March, 1949, the said home was an inadequate two~room home in a very poor condition. After the
decree was entered, the defendant herein, Ercil V. Carter,
spent a substantial amount of money and extensive time on
his own after work and on weekends in reconstructing his
house and making it a suitable residence, which more than
doubled the value of the home. He completely remodeled.
the front two rooms of the house by putting in new flooring, replastering and rewiring the whole house, and added
a sizeable twelve-foot by forty-foot extension to the rear
as well as building a garage beside the home and installing
a furnace. The value of these modifications are in excess
of the sum of $4,000.00. This reconstruction of the home
was done at the expense of the defendant and by his own
labor without any contribution of the plaintiff, and was
done without legal oblia:tion or direction from the Court
and was not intended as a gratuity to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff, Wanda Carter Penrod, remarried. and
moved from the premises, and the home was rented. The
family existing between the parties to this action have
matured and no longer need the residence for a home. The
property was appraised on the 31st of March, 1965, for the
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sum of $8,550.00, and the present fair market value of the
property remains at about rthe same.
Based on the above, the defendant petitioned the Court
to divide and partition the interest in the family home or
to sell the home and award the proceeds first to the defendant for the value of his separate la:bors and exp~nses
put in the property, and to order the remainder of the
proceeds to be divided equally between the plaintiff and
the defendant. The plaintiff petitioned the Court to award
her the home in fee simple. At the Argument of these
Motions, the parties stipulated the essential facts of the
case which were the same as have b€en set out above. The
COurt made its ruling with full knowledge of such facts.
In its ruling, the Court denied all motions and petitions,
thereby leaving the parties in the status quo and not dividing the property, which was held jointly according to
the 1949. decree.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING AND
NCYr GIVING MERIT TO THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION TO DIVIDE AND PARTITION THE INTEREST
IN THE FAMILY HOME.
The purpose of a petition to divide and partition an interest in real property is to determine who is entitled to
what. The defendant's petition was filed with the Court
for the purpose of determining his share or interest in the
family home which the plaintiff had been awarded the use
aild occupancy of as a home for herself and the minor children, who were the issue of the marriage of the plaintiff and
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defendant, under the divorce decree of 1949. Plaintiff, believing that she was entitled to the family home free and
clear of any intere~st of the defendant, petitioned the Court
io award the family home to her. By denying both of
the~e petitions, the Court left the parties in the status quo,
wiih neither having a dear title or knowing what his particular interest therein constituted. The defendant contends, on appeal, that his peUtion was meritorious in light
of the affidavit which was attached to it when filed, the
facts as stipulated to and the wording and intent of the
1949 Divorce Decree. It is stated in Paragraph 4 of the
Cecree issued in 1949, that
"The plaintiff is hereby awarded the house and lot in
which she now resides and in which plaintiff and defendant and their children have been residing for the
use and occupancy of said plaintiff and said minor
children, said plaintiff not to sell said place without
the consent of this Court and agreement of plaintiff
and defendant. It is further ordered that the defendant
maintain the payments due and to become due on the
debt on said place, amounting to $31.90 per month until
said debt is paid in full . . . . Defendant is further ordered to pay all taxes due or which will hereafter become due on said place at the time said taxes
become due and payable."
Under Paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact of the 1949
Decree, it is stated:
"That plaintiff and defendant own a house west of
Provo City in Utah County, State of Uath, where there
is a debt and obligation against said place in approximately the amount of $600.00 .and which is being discharged at the rate of $31.94 per month. And it is
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necessary for the plaintiff to have the cixupancy and
use of said lot and house and the furniture and furnishings therein as a home for herself and her minor children, i,ssue of the marriage of the plaintiff and the
defendant."
Under Paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law in said
Decree, it is further stated:
"That plaintiff be awarded exclusive use and occupancy
of the house and lot owned by the plaintiff and defendant as a home for herself and said minor children, to
gether with all furniture and furnishings now in said
house, and that defendant be required to pay all taxes
a~ thereon or which hereafter will be assessed
thereon and to pay the same when they shall become
due and payable."
Air. can be seen from the above, the defendant retained
an interest in the home according to the Decree, and the
plaintiff was merely awarded the home for her use and
occupancy as a home for herself and the minor children,
which were the issue of the plaintiff and defendant. Further evidence of this was the fact that the defendant was
required to pay tlhe taxes that had accrued and that were
to accrue. in the future on said home, and that he was to
make the monthly payments on the home which were still
outstanding.

The fact that the Court retained jurisdiction over the
property, and would not allow the plaintiff to sell it without the Court's consent clearly indicates that the house
was not granted to the plaintiff in fee simple. In the Decree of Divorce it state3 that the plaintiff cannot sell the
house without the consent of the Court and consent of the
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plaintiff and defendant. This, in itself, indicates that the
Comt wan1:€d to retain jurisdiction over the property in
order that the proceeds of tJhe property could later be divided between the parties after the use of the home was no
longer necessary for the rearing of the children.
In the defendant's affidavit, submitted with his petitjOl)
to divide and partition the interest in the family hQme, b~
states that the purpose of the DecNe a,nd tne a.g~
of the parties at the time of the issuance of the l)ivQrCe
Decree was to grant the ~on and use of the home
for the rearing and the upbringing of the minor childrep.,
but the plaintiff was n<;>t granted fee ~imple title to the
property . The proc."'e€ds of the property were tQ be later
divided between the parties after tJhe use of the h~ was
no longer necessary for the rearing of 1Jhe children. It is
further stated in said affidavit that the plaintiff, Wanda
Carter Penrod, has remarried and moved from the premi~, and the family existing between the parties to the
action have matured and no longer need the ~dence for
a home.
In light of the above stated facts, it seems that the de-_
fendant's petition to divide and partition the interest in tine
family home was meritorious, timely, and well-fowided;
and therefore, the trial court erred. in denying such ~
tion.
As further evidence of the court's error it also <leni~
the plaintiff's petition to award the house to the plaintiff
tn fee simple, thereby leaving both parties in the sta~ q\J.Q.
Nothing was accomplished by either party in presen~
their cause before the Court. Defendant contend$ 9n 3-Ppeal that the court should have made a decision at that
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time as to the particular OIWilership in the property in question and how such ownership should be divided.
POINT II
THE PETITION FILED BY THE DEFENDANT
WAS REASONABLE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH, THEREBY WARRANTING A FAVORABLE RULING BY THE COURT.
In his petition, the defendant asked (1) that the plaintiff, Wanda Carter, a.k.a. Wanda Carter Penrod, be adjudged to have an equity of 1/3 of the fair market value
of the property at the date of the Decree of Divorce from
the defendant on March 14, 1949, said amount to be 1/3
of $4,500.00 or the sum of $1,500.00; (2) that he (the defendant) receive an equity of 2/3 of the fair market value
of the property on the date of the divorce, or the sum of
$3,000.00, and that he be adjudged to have a furtheT equity
in the property for the reasonable value orf his services and
improvements to the property since the date of the Decree
of Divorce in the sum of $4,000.00; (3) that the plaintiff
be required to account to the court for the rental moneys
which she had received from the rent orf the property since
its use as a family home by herself was terminated, and
that the said rental moneys be allocated to the parties in
accordance with their equities and interest in the said
property; and (4) that he be permitted by the court to
purchase all of the equities and interest of the plaintiff in
accord with their present fair market value as appraised;
or, in the alternative, that the court order the sale orf said
property and division of proceeds in accordance with the
inte1·est of each.
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In light of the Utah Law cited hereinafter, it seems
that this petition filed by the defendant was not unreasonable and that the property rights of the plaintiff in this
action shouid be terminated as of the date of the decree.
After the 14th day of March, 1949, the plaintiff is not ent;i tied to any increment in value of the. proyerty resulting
from the expenses and labor of the defendant; and since
the defendant has materially increased the value of this
property, he is entitled to all orf his contribution which was
not provided under the marriage covenant. It would seem
inequitable for the plaintiff to share a claim in the defendant's labors after the plaintiff clailns that she has terml..
nated her relationship with 1him.

In Wo,oley v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391, 195 P2d 743, the
Court awarded the divorce to the defendant husband an the
grounds of mental cruelty. Under the facts of this ca:;e,
neither party had property when they married, but they
worked harmoniously towards financial security and accumulated a substantial estate before the divorce. The
Court ordered. the distribution as follows: The plaintiff wife
received $19,000.00 from the sale of the family home where
the remainder $11,000.00 went to the defendant husband.
The plaintiff also received $10,000.00 war bonds, which the
two had held. Defendant, in addition, received a $41,600.00
from a contract which he held, paid up life insurance on
his life, a $10,000.00 retirement annuity, plus all of his mining interests, for a total of about $53,000.00 in cash and
$10,000.00 in annuity contracts. The Court stated on page
745:
"In determining generally what a wife is entitled to
when a divorce decree has been granted to the bus-
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band, we have considered one-third as being a fair proportion. This is a relative amount which must come,
of course, of necessity, vary with the facts of the particular case."
In applying this rule, the Supreme Court modified the
decree to provide that the sums paid should not be in lieu
of all alimony and that no alimony should be paid unless
defendant should favorably improve his financial standing.
In the case of Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12
P2d 364, in 1932, the Court gave the family home to the
plaintiff wife ~tating that award of property valued at $3,500.00 or $4,000.00, even though it be one-half in value of
all of the husband's property, it seems little enough to give
in compensation for the loss which this wife has sustained
by reason of the husband's wrongs.
In the case of Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55 P 84,
the Court allowed a division of the property granting onethird to the wife, stating that this is equivalent to dissolution of the marriage by death where the common law gave
the widow one-third of the estate.
In the action of Anderson v. Cercone, 54 Utah 339, 180
Pac 586, 1919, the property in question was paid for by the
husband's earnings while the wife contributed sernces in
the looking after the house and children. The Court stated
on page 349:
"Property purchased from the joint earnings from husband and wife as above described, belonged to the husband, ~bject only to such interest as the law gives her
in the property of her husband. In other words, her
rights in suoh property are neither more OT less than
they would be if the husband had bought the prope·rty
with proceeds derived from his separate estate".
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In the case of Stewart v. Stewart, 66 Utah 366, 242
Pac 947, 1926, the plaintiff husband sought and obtained a
divorce from the defendant wife. During the marriage
the plaintiff purchased the dwelling house out of his own
wages while the defendant contributed the furniture from
the house from a rooming house which she had rented
This furniture was of the value of less than $850.00, while
the house was worth po~ibly more than $1,250.00. The
Court stated that the defendant had probably contributed
to the house payments by her own earnings which defrayed
the ~penses of the household, and while the plaintiff may
have contributed some expense money for the household,
he had taken full u.se and advantage of the defendant's
property dW'ing the period of the marriage. Therefore,
the court awarded the real property to each of them as
tenants in common and awarded the used home fW"Dishings
to the defendant.
In Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P'2nd 252,
1943, the marriage between the older plaintiff, age 66, and
the wife lasted five days and was terminated by the fault
of the wife. In this case the court makes it clear that the
basis for property settlement and alimony is not the .prqr ·.
erty concept of dower at common law, but rather is based
upon the following equitable situations as found in the qU<>

tation of the court:

"She is in no different position, neither better nor worse
off, than before the marriage, unless she be wiser for
the experience. . . . . The basis and reason for
allowing alimoo.y to the wife is to repay her for the
years spent in caring for the household, and helping
the husband in building up his property, and to enable
her to live, after the support of the husband is taken
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away from her; or in certain Ca$€S to recompense her
as far as material recompence will do so for injuries
or abuse to her person or impairment of health brought
on by conduct or cruelty of the husband during coverture."
In the case of Johnson vs. Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 152
?2nd 426, 1944, the defendant husband had diabetes and
was unable to work. The parties had been supported on
the relief rolls for much of their married life and it appeared that the plaintiff wife had paid at least part of the
payments on the mortgaged home out of her own money.
There was no award of alimony in the c~ for either the
wife or the children and the court, in making a division of
property decreed that the wife should take the family
dwelling subject to the mortgage, while the husband would
take 1/5 interest which he owned in a dry farm. Neither
the value of the dwelling or its equity, nor the value of the
1/5 interest of the farm appeared in the record. In addition to the real property division, the wife was given one
half of the interest in an insurance policy on the husband's
life. The wife's portion being intended to provide the wife
and children with some measure of security where they
had no indication of any possible income.
In the case of Tremayne vs. Tremayne, 210 P2nd 452
(1949) the court found the wife had worked her entire
married life and had supported the husband while he continued his education and increased his earning power sub-

stantially. The court found that the wife was in substan·
tially no better earning position than at the start of the
marriage. The court also found
"Without her working, the bulk of the property which
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they have would not have been accwnulated, and he
probably could not have accumulated it had he been
single and had he followed the same course which he
did."
During the period of coverture the couple accumulated
property in the value of $2,057.00. Of this amount, the
court awarded the wife $1,651.00 or 4/5 of the property,
and awarded him $406.00.
In the case of Lundgreen vs. LUDdgreell, 112 Utah 31,
184 P2nd 670, 1947, the dispute revolves around the cfis..
tribution of the home of the parties. The evidence indi·
cated that the plaintiff husband paid the original purchase
price on the home, but the wife used some of her funds
for the remodelling of the house and did considerable work
in improving it, although she also did the housekeeping for
it for a period of four years. The Supreme Court, there-

fore, divided the property by determining the value of the
real estate and allowing the plaintiff his original purchase
price and 11z the excess in value of the market price. nie
defendant was awarded one-half of the market value In
excess of the origlnal purchase price. As a fincJ note,
both of the parties were past 70 years of age and were liY:.
ing off their old age assistance.
In addition to the above cited authority, the plaintiff
is now in a position of having another husband to care for
her and has no need for the financial security of this property. She lives in Payson, and affirmatively states she
intends to sell the property. Thus, there are no serious
factors which would require other a division as provided
for in Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55 Pac. 84, where the
court allowed a division of the property, granting 1/3 to
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the wife, stating that this is equivalent to dissolution of
the marriage by death where the common law gave the
widow 1/3 of the estate. There are no factors which would
seem to take the rule out of this case and it would appear
that this is still good law today.
CONCLUSION

The defendant-appellant respectfully urges the Court
to set aside the trial court's order denying the defendant's
petition to divide and partition the interest in the family
home and to remand the case to the lower court with instructions to make a division and partition of the interest
in the family home. The defendant-appellant respectfully
contends: (1) That the Divorce Decree is~med in 1949, both
in word and intent, provides that the plaintiff shall have
the occupancy and use only of the home in question and
that the defendant shall retain an interest therein, and (2)
that the petition of the defendant made to the Court for
a division and partition of the interest in the family home
was meritorious, reasonable, and in accord with the Law
in the State of Utah, and warranted a favorable ruling by
the Court.
Respectfully submitted,
HOWARD AND LEWIS
JACKSON B. HOW.l\RD
Attorney for Appellant
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah

